Black Sea defence tests the path from allied support to operational readiness

Black Sea: detection is not enough

France is extending the deployment of its Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft in Romania by several weeks, its commander said, quoted by RADOR, the Romanian public radio news agency. The mission’s relevance to Bulgaria has a concrete basis. According to the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence, a French patrol aircraft spotted maritime drones and notified the Bulgarian Navy’s operations centre during the attack on CONTSHIP JET on 28 October off Kaliakra. The ministry says three Bulgarian warships were sent to the scene and all 18 crew members were rescued.

This cooperation demonstrates information-sharing followed by a rescue response, but does not establish an ability to prevent the strike. The Atlantique 2 commander says that, on this mission, the aircraft can detect maritime drones but cannot neutralise or intercept them. The Bulgarian statement does not clarify when the container ship was warned or how much time remained before the impacts. In Flank’s assessment, the decisive question is how surveillance connects to a decision to act and an available means of protection. Extended patrols support surveillance, but do not in themselves provide the other links in that chain.

The risk can have consequences even without an attack on a Bulgarian port. According to Richard Meade, editor-in-chief of the maritime publication Lloyd’s List, quoted by the US shipping website gCaptain, some shipowners are looking for grounds to refuse voyages to Bulgaria and Romania. There is no independent confirmation of actual refusals, a decline in traffic or measurable losses. If such decisions are confirmed, they could limit the choice of carriers and delay deliveries. Flank therefore assesses that the results of security measures should also be monitored through the behaviour of commercial operators, not just the number of patrols.

Faster procurement, but not protection in place

On 5 November, NATO announced a procurement platform for counter-unmanned aircraft systems, offering 16 solutions under contracts already in place. According to the official announcement, allies can buy from the catalogue without an additional tender procedure, while €3.1 million has been allocated for further testing. This development coincides with Bulgaria’s accession on 30 October to the “Capabilities to Counter Low-Level Air Threats” initiative, announced by Defence Minister Dimitar Stoyanov. Participation in the initiative does not, however, mean that systems have been acquired or protection established.

In Flank’s assessment, the two mechanisms can help address different obstacles: allied cooperation in capability development and the time needed to conclude a contract. A separate question is what equipment Bulgaria needs and how it will work with existing assets. The general description “counter-drone system” does not guarantee that every offering simultaneously detects, tracks and neutralises targets. The catalogue does not remove the need for testing, integration and training, nor does it establish that a Bulgarian order has been announced.

In parallel, Romania’s defence ministry describes a project for joint drone production with Ukraine worth around €200 million under the European SAFE mechanism, which provides favourable loans for joint defence procurement. The plan includes training, industrial cooperation and technology transfer, but there is no confirmation of a signed contract or the start of production. This project is not a budget for counter-drone protection. In Flank’s assessment, the distinction matters across the eastern flank: producing one’s own aircraft and defending against those of others require different solutions, although both tasks form part of adapting to warfare involving unmanned systems.

The budget choice behind modernisation

The question of Bulgaria’s readiness has taken on a concrete budgetary dimension. According to Minister Dimitar Stoyanov, military salaries will not rise in 2027 because an increase would require cuts to capital expenditure. This is the minister’s position, not a confirmed final budget decision. Without published calculations, it is not possible to establish whether the choice he describes is the only way to fund higher pay.

Meanwhile, Stoyanov says the first five Stryker vehicles have been handed over to the 61st Brigade, another 25 are ready and three are expected by the end of the year. He says Bulgaria is seeking compensation for the delay through spare parts and the earlier provision of older vehicles for training. There is no confirmation that compensation has been agreed. In Flank’s assessment, the key issue here is the link between deliveries and training: handing over equipment is a necessary stage, but the availability of spare parts, training and maintenance determine how it will be used.

This national problem coincides with the European Commission’s warning in its work programme for 2027 that the goal of EU defence readiness by 2030 is at risk despite the decisions taken and funding secured. The Commission envisages an instrument for strategic enablers, including transport and air-to-air refuelling, as well as space and cyber defence. In Flank’s assessment, Bulgaria’s budget debate should not reduce readiness to a choice between personnel and equipment. It is necessary to examine whether spending delivers fully functioning formations, because procurement and pay serve the same ultimate purpose.

Responding to an alert is a separate task

According to the Bulgarian Air Force, MiG-29s on alert at Graf Ignatievo scrambled on 5 November following three bomb threats against passenger aircraft bound for Bulgaria. The Air Force describes the air policing mission as successfully completed, but the results of the inspections after landing are not known. In Romania, the intelligence service says no explosive objects were found during the inspection of a KLM aircraft. That finding cannot be applied to the Bulgarian cases, and no link between the separate threats has been established.

In Flank’s assessment, these cases pose a different problem from defending against a drone that has already been detected: institutions must respond before they know whether the danger is real. The scrambling of fighter aircraft shows that a military response was activated, but does not prove the presence of a bomb. Assessing the system requires both information about the air mission and the results of inspections on the ground. The available information allows neither a calculation of response time nor a conclusion that there was a coordinated campaign.

The civilian side of preparedness also received attention during the week. The European Commission presented non-binding guidelines for people to be able to meet their basic needs during the first 72 hours of an emergency and recommended round-the-clock operation of national contact points under the Civil Protection Mechanism. This is not a response to the specific aviation threats. The analytical connection lies in the need for continuous operation and reliable information amid uncertainty. For Bulgaria, in Flank’s assessment, military response and civilian resilience should be treated as related tasks, without success in one being taken as proof of readiness in the other.

What to watch

In the Black Sea, the most important information will concern follow-up measures to protect shipping and the time between detection, warning and action. According to the Romanian Navy, Exercise Poseidon 26 is scheduled for 6–14 November under Bulgarian leadership, with a Romanian corvette and minehunter taking part. Subsequent statements may show what tasks were actually carried out and how coordination was practised. The participation of a minehunter does not in itself establish a specific mine threat or confirm a capability to counter maritime drones.

In rearmament, the verifiable steps are specific orders, test results, delivery schedules and plans for integration and training. For Bulgaria, this means watching for possible use of the NATO catalogue, the substance of its participation in the initiative against low-level air threats and the final budget decisions for 2027. Under the Stryker programme, what will matter is the actual delivery of further vehicles and whether the intention to secure compensation becomes a contractual commitment.

For civilian flights, the results of inspections and establishing the origin of the threats remain decisive. For shipping, confirmation is needed of whether the refusals of voyages under discussion become actual decisions. In Flank’s assessment, this information will make it possible to judge not only how institutions respond, but also whether the measures limit the consequences for civilian transport and trade.