BulgariaAnalysis
Europe is heading for a clash with Russia: Brussels raises the stakes as the US, China and Moscow reshape the world
Europe's ruling elites keep tying the continent's future to the war in Ukraine despite the growing risk of a direct military clash with Russia. While Washington, Moscow and Beijing look for a new balance of power, Brussels insists on continuing the military confrontation and widening its commitments to Kyiv. At the heart of it is the question of who will shape Europe's future security architecture, and whether Europe itself will have the decisive say over its own fate.

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The Shenzhen meeting: the world is being rearranged without Europe
On 19 November 2026 Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping held a trilateral meeting in the Chinese city of Shenzhen, on the sidelines of the APEC summit. The talks put at one table the leaders of the three states whose relations are decisive for the global military balance.
China's choice as host is symbolic. Shenzhen, which grew within a few decades from a small town into a global technology hub, embodies the shift of economic and industrial weight towards Asia.
But something else matters more.
The European Union, which for decades claimed a leading role in international politics, is not part of this format. Its representatives can dispute the conclusions, insist on taking part in future negotiations and issue their own declarations. That does not change the fact that the three great powers can discuss global security without Europe in the room.
The meeting produced no public agreement on dividing up the world and is not a new Yalta. It was followed by a four-point joint "Declaration on Peace" that does not mention Ukraine. But the format itself reflects a fundamental change: Europe's economic weight no longer guarantees that the continent will always have a seat at every key geopolitical negotiation.
From an American strategy to a European war
One of the most significant paradoxes of the conflict in Ukraine is how its burden has gradually shifted onto the European states.
After the end of the Cold War the United States remained the dominant military power in the Euro-Atlantic system. NATO enlargement, the integration of the Eastern European states into Western institutions and the political confrontation with Moscow changed the continent's strategic balance.
In 2014 Ukraine became the centre of that confrontation. After Russia's annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas and the full-scale invasion of February 2022, relations between Russia and the West entered their most dangerous phase in decades.
Russia's responsibility for launching the full-scale invasion does not remove the need to analyse the wider geopolitical rivalry that preceded the war.
For Washington, limiting Russian influence in Europe is a long-term strategic interest. For Moscow, the expansion of the Western military presence near its borders is part of its own case for new security guarantees.
In that configuration Ukraine became the ground on which incompatible strategic projects collided.
Today, however, European governments are taking on a growing share of the political, financial and defence burden of that confrontation.
This creates the danger that a conflict shaped largely by the US-Russian strategic rivalry turns into a long-term European-Russian clash whose consequences are borne directly by European societies.
Brussels talks of peace but prepares new military commitments
The gap between European declarations of peace and concrete military and political decisions deserves particular attention.
On 19 November, after the Coalition of the Willing meeting in Berlin, the leaders of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Ukraine set out a joint position on Ukraine's future security guarantees. The measures discussed include continued large-scale military and financial support, participation in a US-led mechanism to monitor a possible ceasefire, and a European-led Multinational Force Ukraine.
The commitments envisaged could include a presence in the air, at sea and on land after a possible peace agreement. In Berlin, Trump's envoy Jared Kushner, who two days earlier reported progress towards a deal, said the US had persuaded Russia to accept guarantees for Ukraine based on Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.
The stated purpose of these measures is to deter a new Russian attack and to give Ukraine guarantees.
The strategic question, however, is how Moscow would perceive Western military formations deployed on Ukrainian territory, and under what conditions such a presence could lead to direct confrontation. The Kremlin has repeatedly said it opposes foreign troops in Ukraine, and Lavrov described the presence of French military personnel there as "direct participation" in the war.
A ceasefire accompanied by new military dividing lines and mutually unacceptable guarantees may freeze the fighting without removing the causes of the confrontation.
In such a scenario Europe risks ending up with lasting military obligations and a constant danger of renewed escalation.
This is the great contradiction of the European strategy: seeking security through stronger military deterrence can create additional risks if it is not accompanied by a working political mechanism for negotiation.
The political survival of Europe's elites and the Ukrainian stake
The war in Ukraine is no longer only a matter of foreign policy. It has become a defining part of the political identity of a number of European governments.
For years their leaders tied their own strategy to weakening Russia, to sanctions pressure, to military aid for Kyiv and to the need for Moscow not to achieve its aims by war.
Those decisions required substantial financial resources, changes in energy policy and accelerated rearmament.
What happens if an agreement is reached that does not match the repeatedly stated European goals?
Questions will then inevitably be asked about the cost of the policy so far, the effectiveness of sanctions, missed diplomatic opportunities and the long-term economic consequences.
This raises one of the sharpest geopolitical hypotheses: that for some of those in power, continuing the conflict may prove politically more acceptable than an agreement that would look like the failure of their own strategy.
This does not prove that there is a common European plan for war with Russia. But it raises the legitimate question of how far domestic political survival affects the readiness to compromise.
The higher the political stakes are raised, the harder it becomes to back down.
The strategic trap: Europe and Russia wear each other down
One of the classic ideas of Anglo-Saxon geopolitical thought is to prevent the emergence of a single dominant power in Eurasia.
The British geographer Halford Mackinder formulated the Heartland concept, according to which control of the central spaces of Eurasia is of exceptional importance for world politics.
Historically, the convergence of Western Europe's industrial potential with Russia's resource base has repeatedly been seen as a strategically significant factor.
Today's confrontation between Russia and Europe produces exactly the opposite result.
European industry is losing part of its former economic ties with Russia, while Moscow is accelerating the reorientation of its trade towards Asia.
The two sides are drifting apart, while China is becoming ever more important to the Russian economy.
From the standpoint of American geostrategy such a division has objective advantages: it limits the prospects for an independent Eurasian economic and political centre.
This is not proof that every event is the result of a pre-designed American plan. But the geopolitical consequences are significant enough to be considered regardless of public declarations.
Russia is not fighting only for Donbas
One of the big problems in looking at the conflict in Ukraine is reducing it solely to control over particular territories.
Donbas, Crimea and the land corridor between Russia and Crimea have immediate military significance.
But the Russian demands put to the United States and NATO as early as December 2021 (the drafts of a treaty with the US and an agreement with NATO) show that Moscow is raising a much broader question.
Russia demanded limits on NATO enlargement and on the deployment of certain military forces and systems near Russia's borders. According to Bloomberg sources, Moscow has now again offered restrictions on NATO in the states admitted after 1997, Bulgaria among them.
From the standpoint of Russian strategic planning, the main issue is restoring strategic depth and limiting Western military infrastructure in its immediate neighbourhood.
This logic has historical roots, including the trauma of the German attack of June 1941 and the Soviet Union's enormous human losses in the Second World War.
This explains Russian strategic perceptions without automatically recognising any right of Moscow to determine the foreign policy choices of its neighbours.
The core problem is that the two sides understand security differently.
For Russia it requires limiting the Western military presence.
For NATO it rests on the right of its member states to choose their own alliances and defence arrangements.
As long as this conflict of principles remains unresolved, even an agreement on the territories in Ukraine will not necessarily mean a final end to the confrontation.
The big risk: escalation beyond Ukraine's borders
Long-term military support for Ukraine places Russia and the Western states in a situation of constantly growing danger.
Ukraine's armed forces depend on international deliveries of weapons, ammunition, intelligence and logistical support.
From Moscow's point of view these deliveries are part of the military potential it has to reckon with.
This gives rise to the most dangerous scenario: the conflict spreading to the transport and logistics links that connect Ukraine with its Western partners.
Such a development would create an immediate risk for states such as Poland, Romania and other NATO members. Romanian fighter jets already scramble when air targets are detected near the border with Ukraine, and in Poland an alleged Russian sabotage plan was uncovered.
This does not mean that Russia has decided to strike Alliance territory.
But the risk of miscalculation, an incident or an uncontrolled widening of the fighting cannot be ignored.
Even more dangerous is the question of nuclear deterrence.
Russia and the United States hold the largest nuclear arsenals in the world. A direct clash between Russia and NATO would involve nuclear-armed states.
The assumption that such a war would necessarily remain conventional cannot be accepted as a safe basis for strategic planning.
Why China has no interest in a major European war
China's position is driven by an entirely different strategic logic.
Beijing has an interest in continued economic development, expanding international markets and keeping global trade routes open.
A large-scale war between Russia and NATO could disrupt trade, financial flows and international security on a scale that would directly hit the Chinese economy.
At the same time, the protracted confrontation between Russia and the West increases Moscow's dependence on Beijing.
Russia supplies energy, raw materials and strategic partnership, while China offers a huge market, industrial capacity and technology.
This creates an asymmetric relationship from which Beijing draws economic advantages.
But there is also the opposite risk.
A serious weakening of Russia would change the strategic balance on China's northern borders and could increase the ability of the United States to concentrate resources in the Indo-Pacific.
China's interest, therefore, is not necessarily an unconditional Russian victory or an unlimited continuation of the war, but a balance acceptable to Beijing.
Iran and the struggle for Eurasian transport corridors
The great-power confrontation is not limited to Ukraine.
Iran occupies a key geographical position between Russia, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.
The International North-South Transport Corridor has the potential to give Russia alternative access to southern markets through Iranian territory.
For China, too, the Iranian route matters for energy supplies and overland connectivity.
Iran thus acquires a role that goes far beyond the regional confrontation in the Middle East.
One possible geopolitical reading of US pressure on Tehran is an effort to limit the strategic options not only of Iran but also of its partners.
This interpretation does not exhaust the causes of the conflict, which include Iran's nuclear programme, regional security and relations with Israel.
But it shows why the development of transport corridors and control of energy links are becoming ever more important for the global balance.
The European Union between an energy crisis and military rearmament
Cutting most of its former energy relations with Russia has changed the European economy.
EU states increased supplies from alternative sources, built liquefied natural gas infrastructure and accelerated investment in other energy technologies.
But diversification has its price.
High energy costs remain a serious problem for parts of European industry, especially in sectors that use a lot of electricity and natural gas.
At the same time European governments have to set aside substantial funds for defence, modernising their armed forces and supporting Ukraine.
This creates tension between economic competitiveness, social spending and the new military-strategic obligations.
The question is not whether Europe should have the capabilities to defend itself.
The question is whether accelerated rearmament is part of a long-term security strategy, or whether it is becoming a substitute for the missing political solution to the conflict.
Weapons can create deterrence. They cannot on their own build a lasting architecture of international relations.
Bulgaria cannot afford strategic irresponsibility
For Bulgaria this conflict is no distant geopolitical abstraction.
The country lies on NATO's eastern flank and has direct access to the Black Sea, which is already a zone of active hostilities and dangers to civilian shipping. Only days ago Romania's maritime administration reported a drone strike on a gas carrier in Bulgaria's exclusive economic zone.
Bulgarian territory matters for the transport, military and energy links between Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East.
Any widening of the conflict in the Black Sea could affect national security, port infrastructure, airspace and trade routes.
Particularly important is the role of Türkiye, which controls the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles under the Montreux Convention.
Ankara has shown that it can maintain relations with both Moscow and Kyiv while defending its own strategic interests. It is discussing the safety of Black Sea shipping with Russia and Ukraine.
The Turkish approach shows the importance of an independent assessment of national interests even within allied relations.
For Bulgaria the decisive question is how to combine its obligations to NATO with the need to limit the risks to its own territory and population.
Automatically embracing every initiative that raises military tension cannot replace an independent strategic assessment.
Europe risks turning from a centre of power into a theatre of confrontation
For five centuries the European states played a defining role in the distribution of world political and economic power.
Today the international system is changing.
China is developing its own industrial and technological base on a global scale. The United States seeks to preserve its leading position. Russia insists on revising the security relations established after the Cold War.
In this process Europe faces a particularly hard contradiction.
It has economic resources but is politically divided. It has a developed industry but still faces serious limits in military logistics and strategic capabilities. It claims independent international influence, but a large part of its defence depends on the United States.
The most dangerous thing is that Europe's leaders may keep increasing their military commitments without a convincing answer to the question of how exactly the confrontation with Russia should end.
Continuing the war is not a strategy in itself.
Rearmament is not a political goal.
And refusing to negotiate does not guarantee that the conditions for a future agreement will become more favourable.
European leaders have the right to reject Russian demands they find unacceptable. But they also bear the responsibility to weigh the consequences of every further step towards military confrontation.
This is the essential contradiction of current European policy: the effort to preserve the existing order may lead to actions that further increase the danger to the continent itself.
The historic choice: security through negotiation or permanent confrontation
The Shenzhen meeting did not end the confrontation between the great powers.
It did show, however, that even states with deep strategic differences can talk directly about international security.
For Europe the lesson is especially important.
If the future architecture of European security is determined solely through military escalation, the risk of an even larger conflict will remain constant.
If it is negotiated without real European participation, the continent will face the consequences of decisions over which it had too little influence.
In either case the price could be extremely high.
The main question is whether Europe's leaders will manage to separate the defence of genuine European interests from the need to justify their past political decisions.
Because there is a fundamental difference between defending Europe and drawing it into a direct conflict with Russia.
And the longer that difference is ignored, the greater the danger that European societies will pay the price for strategic decisions whose consequences no one can fully control.
Sources
4 primary or official4 secondary reports
Primary / Official
Синхуа · english.news.cn
Declaration on Peace by the leaders of China, Russia and the United StatesPrimary sourceOtherKremlin · kremlin.ru
Russia–China–US talks in ShenzhenPrimary sourceOtherMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Russia · mid.ru
Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on security guarantees (draft)Primary sourceOtherMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Russia · mid.ru
Agreement on measures to ensure the security of the Russian Federation and member States of NATO (draft)Primary sourceOther
Secondary reporting
CNBC · cnbc.com
Trump, Xi and Putin hold trilateral meeting in ChinaOtherУкринформ · ukrinform.net
Coalition of the Willing leaders urge Russia to agree to winter energy truceOtherМедуза · meduza.io
Zelensky questions whether Kyiv and Washington mean the same thing by NATO-style guaranteesOtherThe Geographical Journal (JSTOR) · jstor.org
Halford J. Mackinder, The Geographical Pivot of HistoryOther
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